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Abstract This special issue of the European Journal of Population focuses on
possible economic consequences of low fertility in Europe. This introduction
reviews the history of falling fertility in Europe and the literature that explores its
causes, its potential implications, and possible policy responses. It also summarizes
the evolution of thinking about the relationship between population growth and
economic development, with attention to recent work on the mechanisms through
which fertility decline can spur economic growth if the necessary supporting con-
ditions are met. The introduction also identifies some of the challenges of popula-
tion ageing that are associated with low fertility and suggests that there may be less
reason for alarm than has been suggested by some observers. The articles that
appear in this special issue are also summarized.
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Re´sume´ Ce nume´ro spe´cial de la Revue europe´enne de De´mographie est centre´ sur
les possibles conse´quences e´conomiques des basses fe´condite´s observe´es en Europe.
Cette introduction rappelle l’historique de la chute de la fe´condite´ en Europe et la
litte´rature qui interroge ses causes, ses implications potentielles et les re´ponses
politiques possibles. Elle synthe´tise e´galement l’e´volution de la pense´e sur les
relations entre la croissance de la population et le de´veloppement e´conomique. Une
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attention particulie`re est porte´e aux travaux re´cents relatifs aux me´canismes par
lesquels le de´clin de la fe´condite´ peut stimuler la croissance e´conomique si les
conditions ne´cessaires sont remplies. L’introduction identifie e´galement les de´fis du
vieillissement de la population associe´s a` la basse fe´condite´ et sugge`re qu’il y a peut-
eˆtre moins de raisons de s’alarmer que ne le laissent entendre certains observateurs.
Elle reprend e´galement les grandes lignes des articles qui figurent dans ce nume´ro.
Mots-cle´s Basse fe´condite´  Europe  Conse´quences e´conomiques
1 Introduction
Fertility rates in European countries have declined dramatically over the past
50 years, and today all European nations have fertility rates below the long-term
replacement rate. Although migration and population momentum have to date kept
these countries from experiencing population decline, the changes in population age
structure that result from persistent low fertility mean that many nations will face
absolute population decline in the near future. With age structure known to be an
important determinant of economic growth, recent studies have raised concerns
about a brewing low fertility crisis in Europe, in which declining and ageing
populations will result in decreased economic growth and lower standards of living.
To better understand this challenge of low fertility in Europe, to draw attention to
various related issues, and to stimulate further thinking, we issued a call for articles
and organized a conference in St. Gallen, Switzerland, in April 2008. Five of the
articles presented at that conference appear in this special issue.
2 Background
The pervasiveness of declining fertility throughout Europe during the past half
century is illustrated in Fig. 1 by time series data on total fertility rates for four
European subregions: Eastern (including Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia
and Ukraine), Northern (Channel Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands,
Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Isle of Man, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and UK),
Southern (Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece,
Holy See, Italy, Malta, Portugal, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Yugoslavia) and Western (Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands and Switzer-
land). In all these subregions and in every country for which the United Nations
provides data with the single exception of Iceland, fertility rates are now below the
long-run replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman.
The population data for these same subregions (Fig. 2) show that, except in
Eastern Europe, population growth has continued to be positive during the entire
period in which fertility has been below the replacement rate. This seeming paradox
substantially reflects a combination of net in-migration and the phenomenon of
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population momentum (i.e. an age structure effect in which total births exceed total
deaths despite low lifetime fertility, because so many individuals are in the prime
childbearing years). Further exploration of these two explanatory factors makes
clear that population momentum was the more important of the two until around
1975, but that after that, even in the context of the modest net in-migration rates
shown in Fig. 3, the two factors have been more nearly equal in recent years.
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Fig. 1 Total fertility rate by subregion. Source: United Nations Population Division 2009. World
Population Prospects online data. Note: Total fertility rate data from the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank are
substantially in line with the UN data
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.5
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
A
nn
u
al
 P
o
pu
la
tio
n 
G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e 
(%
)
E. Europe N. Europe S. Europe W. Europe
Fig. 2 Population growth rate by subregion. Source: United Nations Population Division, 2009. World
Population Prospects online data
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This persistent low fertility has caused abatement in age structure (i.e. population
momentum) effects on population growth over time, meaning that many European
countries increasingly face the prospect of absolute population decline in the
coming years and decades. This point is well illustrated in Table 1, which shows
projected population changes between 2010 and 2050 under three different UN
fertility scenarios. It also shows UN projections for the increase in the share of the
population aged 60 or older, which is also partly due to fertility decline.
Before further discussion, it is important to note that European countries are not
alone in facing these issues: Japan, for example, is in a similar situation, as are
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. The experiences of these other countries may
prove instructive for Europe.
3 Recent Literature
A growing body of literature, of which only a small portion is reviewed here,
documents changing fertility in Europe, explores its determinants, and discusses its
implications. This attention is not surprising given that, as argued by Bloom and
Canning (2008), population growth and age structure may be linked to economic
growth and well-being. Overall, despite considerable disagreement about the causes
of low fertility and the severity of its effects, such studies, when taken together,
suggest a general consensus that European countries may well be facing a crisis of
persistent low fertility that is likely to affect economic growth. The next section of
this introduction focuses specifically on the relationship between population growth
and economic growth.
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Fig. 3 Net migration rate by subregion. Source: United Nations Population Division, 2009. World
Population Prospects online data
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The most commonly cited potential drivers of low fertility include increasing
labour force participation by women, delayed marriage and home-leaving, delayed
childbearing, and the increased social and financial costs of children. Kohler et al.
(2006) categorize these factors into the demographic and behavioural components
they consider most important: economic and social changes, social interaction
processes, demographic distortions and institutional settings. Economic and social
changes include factors like economic uncertainties for those newly entered into the
labour force and increased returns to education; social interaction processes describe
how individual decisions come to reflect broad socioeconomic change; demographic
distortions refer to the way in which the postponement of fertility has led to a
temporary drop in period fertility indicators; and institutional settings include rigid
labour markets, lack of child care, or persistence of traditional gender expectations.
All these factors come into play in explaining low fertility trends in Europe, albeit to
different extents depending on national context.
Some recent studies exploring the relative importance of the causes of low
fertility in Europe have uncovered surprising new patterns. For example, Billari and
Kohler (2004) find that the correlation between fertility and ‘key fertility-related
behaviours such as leaving the parental home, marriage, and women’s labour force
participation’ reversed between 1975 and the late 1990s. For example, countries that
now have high marriage rates and low divorce rates are also the countries with very
low fertility. Similarly, Sobotka and Toulemon (2008) show that, because of this
reversed relationship between marriage and fertility indices, the shift in family
patterns across Europe towards fewer marriages and more children born outside
marriage cannot be considered a major factor in fertility decline. Rather, in contrast
to historical patterns, it now appears that where marriage rates are higher, fertility
rates are lower.
A number of social factors are influencing fertility trends. For instance, Goldstein
et al. (2003) argue that changing fertility ideals have helped to maintain low fertility
rates, with families in Germany and Austria desiring fewer children on average (and
fewer than replacement would require). Frejka (2008) charts what he calls the
‘decline of the two-child family model’ as a contributing factor in low fertility rates,
and Frejka and Sobotka (2008) emphasize the effect of delayed childbearing.
Table 1 Projected population change by subregion
Fertility scenario Population growth
2010–2050 (%)
Change in 60? share 2010–
2050 (percentage points)
5-yr period in which growth
rate turns (and then remains)
negative
Low Med High Low Med High Med
Europe -17 -6 7 17 12 8 2015–2020
Eastern -28 -18 -6 19 14 10 1990–1995
Northern 1 14 28 11 7 4 N/A
Southern -11 0 12 18 14 10 2025–2030
Western -13 -2 10 15 11 7 2025–2030
Source: United Nations Population Division, 2009. World Population Prospects online data
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A scenario in which delayed childbearing results in fertility rate declines without a
change in ideal family size (assuming that most women can achieve desired family size
despite initiating families later in life) should be heartening to concerned policymakers
because it implies an expectation that fertility rates will recover somewhat as current
cohorts of childbearing women age. In fact, Bongaarts (2002) argues that such is
indeed the case: fertility rates are low, but not nearly as low as traditional measures
suggest because the trend of delayed childbearing temporarily depresses period
fertility measures. Frejka and Sobotka (2008) provide further evidence to support this
argument, showing how in some European countries, notably in Western and Northern
Europe, there appears to have been a ‘recuperation’ because of delayed births.
Yet, this same recuperation does not hold for German-speaking countries or for
Southern Europe. Rather, the existence of this and other distinctive patterns points
to another set of debates surrounding fertility rates in Europe: the degree of
divergence between countries and its meaning for theories of the relationship
between economic development and fertility. For a long time, demographers held
that fertility rates in developed countries will converge at or near the replacement
level (Kirk, 1996). However, what is being seen today is strikingly different. Not
only do Western and Northern European countries not show evidence of the same
very low fertility rates seen in Southern and Central Europe (Frejka and Sobotka
2008), but also it appears likely that the divergence in fertility patterns in European
countries will persist in the long term (Frejka et al. 2008; Sobotka 2004).
Very low rates may be attributable to countries’ particular institutional settings
(Kohler et al. 2006) in which child care support is insufficient and labour markets
are particularly inflexible with respect to part-time work or re-entry into the labour
force. In some such cases, tax credits or other financial support to families with
children are also low or lacking. Overall, these new patterns of divergence among
countries seem to indicate that the relationship between level of development and
fertility rate is not as clear cut as once assumed, an idea that some scholars dispute
(e.g. Bryant 2007). However, empirical evidence from Myrskyla¨ et al. (2009)
suggests that development progress can be associated with a rise in fertility,
meaning that new trends should at least be carefully examined.
Therefore, what policies might be put in place to address low fertility? One
obvious answer is pronatalist policies that encourage women to have children,
whether by providing child care, financial incentives, or flexible work environments.
Lutz et al. (2003) suggest that the most effective policies would be those that
discourage delayed childbearing, an idea that makes sense given the attribution of
low national fertility rates to the increasing age of women at first birth.
Nonetheless, not all agree that such policy measures would have any effect. For
example, based on their studies of Austria and Germany, Goldstein et al. (2003)
argue that it will be difficult to reverse declines in ideal family size through
pronatalist policies. Frejka et al. (2008) are likewise pessimistic about policy’s
ability to influence current trends. On the other hand, Hoem (2008, p. 256), having
considered evidence from France and the Nordic countries, believes that coordi-
nated public policy measures to promote fertility may be effective, although only if
‘embedded in a family-friendly culture deliberately nurtured by the state’.
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In contrast, Sobotka (2004) suggests that low fertility does not need to be
understood as a crisis because it could be offset in particular through increases in
immigration. Thus, although immigration policies are obviously highly contentious
and can be difficult to implement, encouraging in-migration to countries whose
working-age populations are declining while old-age populations are rising may
well be the fastest route to avoiding economic slowdown. Lutz (2006) even
disagrees that there is much of a crisis to be avoided, noting that declines in
population size would be welcome from an environmental perspective and that
economic losses might be offset if human capital investment were to increase as a
result.
4 Focusing on the Potential Economic Consequences of Demographic Changes
Consideration of the consequences of low fertility in Europe takes place in a broader
context, with increased attention having recently been given to the potential
consequences of demographic change for economic growth in Europe.
4.1 Consequences Related to the Demographic Transition
Economists have long explored the relationship between population and economic
growth. Thomas Malthus (1798) initiated interest in this topic when he predicted
that population growth, driven by the ‘irrepressible attraction between the sexes’,
would inevitably outstrip the available food supply—and that widespread suffering
would result. At the time, world population was approximately 1 billion. Paul
Ehrlich (1968), writing shortly after world population crossed the 3 billion mark,
made a set of predictions about the extent to which rapidly increasing population
would have dire environmental, social and economic consequences. Just after world
population crossed the 6.5 billion mark, Ehrlich reiterated the importance of
understanding the negative environmental consequences of population growth
(Ehrlich, 2008).
Around the same time Ehrlich initially put forth his argument, the opposite view
began to gain support. Simon Kuznets (1967), Esther Boserup (1981), and Julian
Simon (1981) argued that resource shortages would stimulate human ingenuity and
lead to rapid technological advancement and institutional innovation—and that
these developments would spur sufficiently rapid increases in food production and
living standards to avoid mass misery.
In the mid-1980s, a more neutral view came to the fore. A report by the National
Research Council in the United States (1986) concluded that there was no
connection between population growth and economic growth. Indeed, of the many
countries in which population has grown rapidly, there is a very wide range of
economic growth rates. Looking at the growth rate of a country’s population as a
whole, no statistically significant pattern emerges with regard to economic growth.
This view, known as ‘population neutralism’, held sway until the late 1990s.
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Now, a large body of work carried out during the last 10 years has breathed new
life into this issue. The salient observation that sparked this new review stemmed
from the effect of the demographic transition on the age structure of a population.
As is well-known to demographers (but was often neglected by economists), the
transition begins with declines in mortality that disproportionately benefit infants
and children and that create the leading edge of a bulge in the age distribution. The
trailing edge of this bulge is created when fertility subsequently declines, which it
invariably does as parents perceive the need for fewer births to achieve their family
size goals and as those goals naturally moderate. The result—sometimes lasting as
little as five decades—is a temporary boost in the working-age share of the
population. Economists ignored this pattern at their peril, as it holds crucial keys to
understanding the effect of demographic change on economic growth. Eventually,
of course, the relatively high ratio of working-age to non-working-age people
dissipates, and the old-age share of the population rises. The possible effects of this
latter phenomenon are under study and are discussed briefly below.
Bloom and Williamson (1998) develop this line of enquiry and find that roughly
one-third of East Asia’s phenomenal economic growth between 1965 and 1990—often
known as the ‘East Asian economic miracle’, because it was so difficult to explain—
can be accounted for by the high share of working-age individuals in the countries that
experienced rapid economic growth. Although this early work did not decisively
establish a causal connection from demographic change to economic growth, the
posited mechanism was clear: the historically high share of working-age people in the
population meant that, if those people were employed, the share of the total population
that was working would be higher than it had previously been. Concomitantly, the
relatively low number of child dependents meant that countries had less need to
expend resources in taking care of the young or in building schools for them. Similarly,
since the elderly population had not yet risen appreciably in size, there was no
significant burden of the dependent elderly. These conditions prevailed throughout
East Asia. The large working-age population was productively employed, leading to
rapid economic growth. Research supporting this line of argument includes Bloom and
Canning (2008), Bloom et al. (2000), Lee and Mason (2006) and Mason (2001).
There are several mechanisms through which a high share of working-age people
leads to more rapid economic growth. Some of these mechanisms can be called
‘accounting’ channels, as they reflect mechanical changes that result from the way
in which economic growth is measured. However, there are also ‘behavioural’
mechanisms at work.
One key piece of the basic accounting mechanism is straightforward: if a larger
fraction of the population is of working age and employed, the economic output per
capita increases, assuming reasonably stable levels of output per worker. A second
piece of the accounting mechanism is less well-known: working-age people tend to
save more than non-working-age people. A higher share of working-age people
means that aggregate savings will tend to rise. If an economy is functioning in some
reasonable fashion, those savings can be channelled into investment, which is
crucial for economic growth.
Other, less obvious factors—ones that stem from behavioural changes—are also at
work. First, since one aspect of demographic change is greater longevity, workers have
134 D. E. Bloom, A. Sousa-Poza
123
an incentive to save more for supporting themselves in old age (Bloom et al. 2007a, b).
Second, a country with a small average number of children can typically afford to
invest more in the education of each child. (For the seminal discussion of human
capital, see Becker 1964.) With small family size, both public and private (family)
investment can rise, leading to better-educated children, who in turn can become more
productive workers. This channel is particularly important as ever-more-technologi-
cally progressive societies call for more highly educated workers. Third, and parallel
to the education channel, both public and private expenditures on health—spread over
a smaller number of children—can lead to better child and adult health, resulting in
better learners and workers. And fourth, smaller family sizes lead to greater labour
force participation of women (Bloom et al. 2009). This factor amplifies the tendency
for the number of workers per capita to rise as the demographic transition proceeds.
Of course, the story is not quite that straightforward. Although a high share of
working-age people can spur substantial economic growth, i.e. generate a ‘demo-
graphic dividend’, this outcome is by no means assured. There are other prerequisites
to economic growth, which are important to understand if one is to pinpoint the
channels that potentially connect demographic change and economic growth. First, a
country must have a government that is capable of responsibly directing economic
policy, making crucial infrastructure investments, and guaranteeing the conditions
under which the private sector can draw upon savings to make productive investments.
Second, trade policy must be carefully thought out and implemented insofar as
openness to trade tends to promote economic growth. Third, a country needs to have an
educated populace, and as economic development proceeds, a higher level of
education becomes more necessary. Fourth, a country must have a reasonably healthy
population—one that is not prevented from working hard (or from learning well during
schooling years) by illness. Fifth, a country’s labour market policies must encourage
employment and not pose unnecessary barriers to hiring. And sixth, a country must
have reasonably amicable relationships with its neighbours and with farther-flung
countries. Many other factors also come into play, but the ones listed here are highly
beneficial—and often crucial—to realization of the demographic dividend.
Conversely, the absence of these propitious conditions can create a demograph-
ically driven economic debacle. Legions of unemployed young adults are a recipe
for civic unrest. An uneducated, unhealthy population is unlikely to be able to be
highly economically productive. An ill-performing government that sets a country
on an ill-fitting economic pathway will not be able to benefit from a high working-
age share. And wars can destroy the possibility of economic growth very quickly.
The demographic transition has now begun to take place in nearly every country
in the world, and in some, it is long complete. Some countries have benefited
economically from demographic change, others have failed to reap the potential
dividend, and in still others, the die is not yet cast.
4.2 Consequences Arising after the Demographic Transition
All European countries are now operating in a post-demographic-transition phase
with fertility rates below long-run replacement levels. The classic story of the
demographic transition did not anticipate that fertility rates would fall so low.
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Indeed, Europe’s low rates are unprecedented. European institutions are thus facing
new challenges, with no models to follow. Although the channels through which
demographic change can affect economic growth have long been operative in
Europe, the region’s persistent low fertility rates raise the question that is the subject
of this volume: the economic consequences of low fertility.
In addition, of course, as discussed above, European societies are rapidly
becoming much older. Several observers (e.g. Peterson 1999) have predicted that a
higher share of elderly (and generally less economically productive) people will
result in a significant slowing of economic growth. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (2005) has expressed similar concerns. However,
recent research is considerably less alarmist. For example, Bloom et al. (2009) argue
that the share of workers in the total population will actually rise, not fall, in coming
decades due to declining fertility and increased participation of women in the labour
force. Still, some countries may face labour shortages, and one obvious solution—
increased immigration of working-age people—is unlikely to be politically feasible.
However, even without such immigration, the ageing of the population in most
countries is unlikely to cause significant deterioration of economic growth.
5 Contributions to the Special Issue
The case that low fertility in Europe is a topic that warrants a special issue of this
journal is supported by David Bloom, David Canning, Gu¨nther Fink, and Jocelyn
Finlay’s (2010) investigation of how changes in fertility will affect income per
capita in Europe. Most particularly, although their analysis predicts that short-term
effects will be largely positive—i.e. a rise per capita income—the long-term outlook
is less rosy. That is, the fall in youth dependency rates has created an initial rise in
per capita income that will give way to increasing old-age dependency combined
with smaller working-age cohorts, thereby creating a potentially unsustainable
scenario for national economic well-being. Hence, the authors argue, to prevent the
potential negative economic effects of demographic change related to low fertility,
governments and policymakers will need to influence labour force participation
rates. For example, changing social security or child care policies can encourage
people to remain in or re-enter the workforce.
However, Lee and Mason (2010) study of the interaction between demographic
change and human capital investment challenges the assumption of a straightforward
association between low fertility, population ageing and economic decline. Their
analysis addresses two questions: might smaller birth cohorts lead to an increased
investment in the health and education of individual children and, if so, could
standards of living rise in spite of a population age structure that would seem to work
against it? Drawing on data from the National Transfer Accounts project, they
provide new cross-country estimates of spending on children’s health and education
that, given certain assumptions, imply that human capital expenditures per child may
be substantially higher when fertility is lower. Applying these estimates and a simple
model, they show that the increased human capital investment associated with lower
fertility may mitigate the increased cost associated with an ageing population.
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With an eye to better informing policy development, contributors Zamac et al.
(2010) consider the mechanisms by which countries may become caught in (and
escape from) a low fertility trap and its economic effects. Using an agent-based
simulation model that draws on data and policy from Sweden, they show that an
increase in the relative costs of children can cause a fertility trap to occur only if
social norms start adapting to lower fertility. In their model, escaping from the trap
requires costly and persistent policy measures to counteract the effects of adapting
social norms. Although they are careful to note that their virtual world is vastly
simplified and may not reflect all the conditions that influence a country’s fertility,
the unexpectedness of their results and the central role played by social norms
suggests that escaping from a low fertility trap may be more complicated than
previously thought and may require innovative policies to influence individual
behaviours.
As already suggested, European countries may well learn how to address the
future challenges of low fertility by examining the experiences, past and projected,
of other nations. In their analysis of the Japanese labour market, contributors Clark
et al. (2010) use demographic data to project the evolution of the Japanese economy
as the country experiences low fertility combined with increasing life expectancy.
Their examination of different age-specific employment rates and the policies that
might affect them suggests that it would be possible for the government to
implement policies that would increase the labour force. Such policies might, for
example, address the conditions that influence Japanese workers’ retirement
decisions, including declines in social security benefits and pensions and improve-
ments in old age health and longevity. Likewise, they might encourage Japanese
women, whose participation in the labour market has been historically low, to work
in the formal sector. Such increased participation by women and those over age 60
could lessen some of the anticipated declines in employment. The authors note,
however, that Europe, with a much higher proportion of women already in the
workforce, must focus more on the over-60 population or look to other policy
measures like increased in-migration.
Since a declining labour force is only one of the myriad ways in which a
changing population age structure will affect European economies, Bo Malmberg
(2010) examines the relationship between low fertility and another mechanism—the
housing market. Drawing on panel data from Swedish municipalities, he shows that
an ageing population (one result of low fertility) may lead to a slowing in the growth
of house prices, partly because the elderly have a lower demand for housing than do
younger age cohorts. As the housing market is an important component of the
economy in most high-income countries, this finding has important implications for
understanding the economic effects of low fertility.
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